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Abstract. Relying on a trusted third party (TTP) in the design of a
security protocol introduces obvious risks. Although the risks can be
mitigated by distributing the trust across several parties, it still requires
at least one party to be trustworthy. In the domain of exams this is
critical because parties typically have conflicting interests, and it may
be hard to find an entity who can play the role of a TTP, as recent exam
scandals confirm. This paper proposes a new protocol for paper-based
and computer-based exams that guarantees several security properties
without the need of a TTP. The protocol combines oblivious transfer and
visual cryptography to allow candidate and examiner to jointly generate
a pseudonym that anonymises the candidate’s test. The pseudonym is
revealed only to the candidate when the exam starts. We analyse the
protocol formally in ProVerif and prove that it satisfies all the stated
security requirements.
1 Introduction
This paper considers written exams and studies how to guarantee secure and
fair examination although any participant can cheat.
The security of exam protocols has been brought to the public attention by
recent surveys and scandals [11, 14, 15]. They show that information technology
makes cheating easier and that candidates and authorities have interest in frauds.
For example, in the Atlanta public school scandal [11], the authorities raised all
the markings to improve the school’s ranking and get more public funds. In
spite of that, previous exam systems still consider candidate’s cheating as the
sole security threat, while exam authorities and examiners are assumed to be
fully trusted. A deeper understanding of the exam’s threats would be also useful
for similar assessment systems, such as public tenders, personnel selections, and
project reviews. As in the case of exams, the security of such systems should not
rely on TTP.
Recently a few works argued about the security of exam with corrupted
examiners (e.g., [4, 16]); however, their designs still assume some trusted parties.
We propose a new security protocol for exams that requires no trusted party
while meeting a set of stringent security properties that extend the requirements
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for ones defined by Dreier et al. [8, 9]. Our protocol relies on oblivious transfer
and visual cryptography techniques to generate a pseudonym that anonymises
a candidate’s test. No participant learns the pseudonyms until the exam starts.
Candidates take the exam in a test center, and testing is the only face-to-face
phase, while the other phases are remote. Our protocol suits both paper-based
and computer-based examination.
Contribution. This paper provides three main contributions. First, it extends a
set of security requirements for exams with three new authentication and one
accountability property. Second, it proposes a new exam protocol that satisfies
the extended requirements without relying on a TTP. Finally, it formalises the
protocol in ProVerif and proves the protocol ensures all the properties.1
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the related work.
Section 3 describes and formalises the desired properties our protocol aims to
ensure, and defines the threat model. Section 4 details the protocol. Section 5
describes the formal analysis of our protocol in ProVerif [5], and discusses the
results. Section 6 outlines future work and concludes the paper.
2 Related work
The majority of works on exam protocols describe security requirements only
informally (e.g., [22, 3]) with a few exceptions. Dreier et al. [8] propose a for-
mal framework in the applied pi-calculus to define and analyse authentication
and privacy requirements for exams. They analyse two existing electronic exam
protocols as case studies. Foley et al. [12] introduce a formalisation of confi-
dentiality requirements for Computer Supported Collaborative Working. They
propose exams as case study with no references to specific exam protocols.
Other works propose secure exam protocols, but argue informally their se-
curity. Castella-Roca et al. [6] introduce an exam protocol which guarantees a
number of authentication and privacy properties in presence of a fully trusted
exam manager. Bella et al. [4] describe WATA IV, a protocol that also relies on
visual cryptography and considers corrupted examiner, but assumes an honest-
but-curious anonymiser. Huszti and Petho˝ [16] propose an exam protocol with
minimal trust requirements, but a trusted registry. Giustolisi et al. [13] describe
Remark!, an internet-based exam protocol that ensures authentication and con-
ditional anonymity requirements with minimal trust assumption. The protocol
generates pseudonyms via an exponentiation mixnet, which assumes at least one
honest mix server.
Maffei et al. [18] suggest anonymous credential schemes to guarantee privacy
in course evaluation systems without relying on a TTP. Their approach seems
to be alternative to ours, as we use oblivious transfer and visual cryptography.
Formal approaches have been proposed in the area of conference manage-
ment systems, a domain close to exams. Arapinis et al. [2] propose and formally
1 Our code is available at http://apsia.uni.lu/stast/codes/exams/pv isec15.tar.gz
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analyse ConfiChair, a cryptographic protocol that addresses secrecy and privacy
risks coming from a malicious cloud. Their work has been recently extended to
support any cloud-based system such as public tender management and recruit-
ment process. Kanav et al. [17] introduce CoCon, a formally verified implemen-
tation of conference management system that guarantees confidentiality. All of
the mentioned systems, however, assume trusted managers.
3 Security requirements and threat model
An exam basically involves two main roles: the candidate, who takes the test,
and the examiner, who evaluates it. A typical exam runs in phases: at prepara-
tion, the exam is set up, for instance, the candidate registers and questions are
generated; at testing the candidate gets the questions and takes the exam, while
the examiner collects the answered test; at marking the examiner evaluates the
test; at notification, the candidate is informed of her mark. Some duties may
be assigned to sub-roles. For instance, an administrative office might ensure the
registration of candidates, and notify them the marks.
We start considering the security requirements that other works argued to be
relevant for exams [8, 4], and extend this set with five new requirements, includ-
ing novel authentication and accountability properties. To express our require-
ments unambiguously, we use the applied pi-calculus [1] as done in [8]. Therefore,
we assume that our requirements refer to a model of an exam modelled as applied
pi-calculus process. The applied pi-calculus defines events to formulate correspon-
dence assertions (authentication), and uses observational equivalence to express
indistinguishability (privacy).
Authentication In the applied pi-calculus, an event is a message output e(a⃗):
e is the event channel and a⃗ a, possible empty, list of arguments. The message
appears in the trace as soon as the execution of the process reaches the event.
To formalise authentication, we use some of the events defined in [8] as follows.
The term idc is the candidate’s identity, pid is the form identifier, ques in-
dicates the exam questions, ans indicates the candidate’s answers, mark is the
mark. The event reg(idc) denotes a successful registration of the candidate idc .
The event submitted(idc , ques,ans,pid) is emitted when the candidate submits
her answer, while collected(idc , ques,ans,pid) is emitted by the examiner when
he collects the answer. Finally, the event notified(idc ,mark ,pid) is emitted when
the examiner notifies and registers a mark to the candidate.
We add requested(idc ,pid) to the set of events outlined above. It is emitted
by the candidate process at notification, where candidate idc sends the request
to learn her mark using the identifier form.
The first requirement we consider is Answer Authenticity, which informally
says that the examiner collects the answer as submitted by the candidate.
Definition 1 (Answer Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Answer Au-
thenticity if the event collected(idc , ques,ans,pid) is preceded by the event
submitted(idc , ques,ans,pid) in every execution trace of the protocol.
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Answer Origin Authentication says that the examiner only collects answers
originated by registered candidates.
Definition 2 (Answer Origin Authentication) An exam protocol ensures
Answer Origin Authentication if the event collected(idc , ques,ans,pid) is pre-
ceded by the event reg(idc) in every execution trace of the protocol.
We define three novel authentication requirements: Mark Authenticity, Can-
didate Authorisation, and Notification Request Authentication.
Definition 3 (Mark Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Mark Authen-
ticity if the event notified(idc ,mark ,pid) is preceded by the event
submitted(idc , question,answer ,pid) in every execution trace of the protocol
Mark Authenticity says that the mark is correctly registered to the corre-
sponding candidate. Dreier et al. defines it as “the candidate is notified with the
mark delivered by the examiner” [8]. Despite looking similar, our formulation
expresses something different: in ours the authenticator is the examiner because
he emits the event notified , while in Dreier et al. the authenticator is the candi-
date, since the event is emitted in the candidate process. We think that Def. 3
avoids overlapping definitions because, as we shall see later, Mark Verifiability
considers the candidate as authenticator. It describes that a candidate can check
if she has been notified with the correct mark despite a corrupted examiner.
The second novel requirement, Candidate Authorisation, describes that only
registered and authenticated candidates can take the exam.
Definition 4 (Candidate Authorisation) An exam protocol ensures Candi-
date Authorisation if the event submitted(idc , ques,ans,pid) is preceded by the
event reg(idc) in every execution trace of the protocol.
The last additional requirement is Notification Request Authentication. It
says that a mark can be associated with the candidate only if she requests to
learn her mark. This unusual requirement is useful in the exam scenarios of some
universities, where candidates have to skip the next exam session if they get a
fail, unless they withdraw from the exam before notification.
Definition 5 (Notification Request Authentication) An exam protocol en-
sures Notification Request Authentication if the event notified(idc ,mark) is pre-
ceded by the event requested(idc ,pid) in every execution trace of the protocol.
Privacy For reason of space, we present only the informal definitions of the
privacy requirements. The formal definition in applied pi-calculus can be found
in [8].
The first relevant privacy requirement is Anonymous Marking, which says
that no one can learn the author of a test before it is marked. In other words,
no one but the author can link the test with the candidate identity until after
the marking phase. Question Indistinguishability says that no candidate learns
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the question before the testing phase. A strong requirement is Mark Privacy,
which describes that no one, besides the examiner and the concerned candidate,
learns the marks. It implies that marks cannot be public. The last privacy re-
quirement is Mark Anonymity, which says that no one, besides the examiner
and the concerned candidate, can learn the mark assigned to a candidate. Note
that Mark Privacy is intuitively stronger than Mark Anonymity: a system that
publishes the marks cannot guarantee Mark Privacy while may still ensure Mark
Anonymity provided no one can link a mark to a candidate identity.
Verifiability and Accountability We propose two properties, one for verifi-
ability, and one for accountability of exams. Generally speaking, a protocol is
verifiable with respect to a specific property if the protocol provides a test for
the property, and the test is sound and complete [9]. Mark Verifiability says
that the candidate can verify she has been notified with the mark assigned to
her test. Mark Verifiability subsumes the existence of an algorithm testMV that
outputs true if the candidate has been notified with the mark assigned to her
test, or false otherwise. In the applied pi-calculus, testMV is a process that emits
the event OK (idc ,pid ,mark) when it is supposed to output true and KO when
it supposed to output false. The event published(pid) is emitted when a test
identified with pid is available. The event assigned(idc ,pid ,mark) is emitted by
the candidate at end of notification.
We say that testMV is sound if the event OK (idc ,pid ,mark) is preceded by
the events assigned(idc ,pid ,mark) and published(pid) in every execution trace
of the protocol. We say that testMV is complete if the event KO is emitted in
no execution trace of the protocol when the test fed with correct data.
Definition 6 (Mark Verifiability) An exam protocol ensures Mark Verifia-
bility if testMV is sound and complete.
Finally, we introduce an accountability requirement, namely Testing Dispute
Resolution. Accountability allows to identify which party is responsible for a
protocol failure. In the case of exam, a candidate should be able to submit a
test and receive the corresponding mark. If she fails in any of these, Testing
Dispute Resolution describes that the participant who caused such failure can
be identified.
We formally model Testing Dispute Resolution similarly to Mark Verifiabil-
ity, with a difference: we use (non)reachability of the event Cguilty or Eguilty
also to prove soundness. In the applied pi-calculus, dispute is a process that
emits the event Cguilty when the candidate is the culprit and Eguilty if the
examiner is the culprit. If the protocol executes the process dispute then either
the examiner or the candidate is corrupted. Thus, regarding soundness, the idea
is to check that dispute cannot return an honest party instead of the corrupted
one.
We say that dispute is sound with respect to a corrupted examiner and
honest candidate if the event Cguilty is emitted in no execution trace of the
protocol. Similarly, we say that dispute is sound with respect to a corrupted
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candidate and honest examiner if the event Eguilty is emitted in no execution
trace of the protocol. Finally, we say that dispute is complete if neither the
event Eguilty nor Cguilty are emitted in any execution trace of the protocol
with honest roles.
Definition 7 (Testing Dispute Resolution) An exam protocol ensures Test-
ing Dispute Resolution if dispute is sound and complete.
3.1 Threat model and assumptions
According our exam terminology, we consider the threats coming from the three
following adversaries. (1) Corrupted candidates, who want to be assigned with
a mark higher than an objective evaluation of their answers deserve. They thus
may not follow the protocol and collude each other to achieve their goal. (2) A
corrupted examiner, who wants to assess a candidate unfairly. (3) An intruder,
who wants to get exam’s private information or tamper with tests and marks,
and may corrupt candidates or the examiner.
We assume that (a) remote communications between examiner and candi-
date occur via TLS; (b) model answers are kept secret from candidates until
after testing; (c) during the testing, invigilators supervise candidates to mitigate
cheating, and (d) an authenticated append-only bulletin board is available.
4 The protocol
In a nutshell, the protocol works as follows. At preparation, candidate and ex-
aminer jointly generate the candidate’s pseudonym (an alphanumeric pid) as a
pair of visual cryptography shares, by means of an oblivious transfer scheme.
One share is hold by the candidate, who prints it on a paper sheet together with
the candidate ID and signatures meant for integrity and accountability purposes.
The other share is held by the examiner, who prints it on a transparency printout.
Each share alone does not reveal the pseudonym, which is revealed only when
the shares are overlapped. This is possible only at testing, when the candidate
and the examiner physically meet, and the examiner hands his transparency to
the candidate. Any dispute that happens at testing can be solved thanks to the
signatures printed with the printouts. The candidate can write the pseudonym
down into the answer sheet, and the testing concludes when all answer sheets
are returned to the examiner. At marking, the examiner evaluates the answers,
and assigns a mark to each pseudonym, which she commits and publishes on
a bulletin board. At notification, a candidate can retrieve her mark by proving
she owns the share that (re)-reveals the pseudonym. The examiner’s share is
required for this phase, but there is no need for the candidate and the examiner
to meet. The candidate sends her share and the signatures to the examiner, and
any dispute happening at notification can be again solved using the signatures
associated with the shares.
The protocol combines a few cryptographic primitives, namely visual cryp-
tography, commitment, and oblivious transfer schemes:
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1. Candidate calculates yi = gxihγi where:
- xi ∈R Z∗q .
- γi ∈R [1, k].
- i = 1,2, . . . , l with l > n.
2. Candidate→Examiner : y1, y2, . . . , yl.
3. Examiner calculates βij ←piR (αi ⊕ cj), ωij = ⟨aij , bij⟩← ⟨grij , βij ( yihj )rij ⟩,
com = hs l∏
i=1 giαi , and sign1 = SignSSKE{idC, ex, com} where:
- αi ∈R [0,1]t×u.
- s, rij ∈R Z∗q .
- gi ∈R Gq.
- i = 1,2, . . . , l.
- j = 1,2, . . . , k.
or runs the challenge procedure against y1, y2, . . . , yl.
4. Examiner→Candidate: (ω11, . . . , ω1k), . . . (ωl1, . . . , ωlk) and sign1 .
5. Candidate calculates χi ∈ [1, l] and σj ∈ [1, l] where:
- i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
6. Candidate→Examiner : χ1, χ2, . . . , χm and σ1, σ2, . . . , σn.
7. Examiner calculates evχi = ⟨αχi , (βχi1, βχi2, . . . , βχik), (rχi1, rχi2, . . . , rχik)⟩ and
sign2 = SignSSKE{idC, ex, (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn)} where
- i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
- j = 1,2, . . . , k.
and prints transp = ⟨(ασ1 , ασ2 , . . . , ασn), idC, ex,QR3⟩ where
- QR3 = idC, ex, (α1, α2, . . . , αl, s).
8. Examiner→Candidate: evχ1 , evχ2 , . . . , evχm and sign2 .
9. Candidate checks evχi , calculates βσj = bσjγj(aσjγj )xσj where
- i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
- j = 1,2, . . . , n.
and prints paper = ⟨(βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn), idC, ex,QR1,QR2⟩ where
- QR1 = idC, ex, sign1 .
- QR2 = idC, ex, sign2 .
10. Candidate
handsÐÐÐ→Examiner : idC′
11. Examiner checks if idC′=idC
12. Examiner
handsÐÐÐ→Candidate: transp, test question
13. Candidate calculates pid = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ⊕ (β1, β2, . . . , βn) and writes
test answer = (answers,pid)
or runs the Testing Dispute Resolution algorithm if no pseudonym appears.
14. Candidate
handsÐÐÐ→Examiner : test answer
15. Examiner calculates c = gvhmark and sign3 = SignSSKE{pid , c} where:
- v ∈R Z∗q .
- mark ∈M .
16. Examiner→ BB: sign3
17. Candidate→Examiner :(β1, β2, . . . , βn), sign1 , sign2 , sign3
18. Examiner calculates sign4 = SignSSKE{idC, ex, pid,mark , v}
19. Examiner→Candidate: sign4
Fig. 1. Our protocol divided in phases
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Visual Cryptography. It is a secret sharing scheme, first devised by Naor and
Shamir [19] that allows a visual decryption of a ciphertext. A secret image is
“encrypted” by splitting it into a number of image shares. In the 2-out-of-2
version, which is the one adopted in our protocol, the secret image is split into
two shares. When the shares are overlapped, they reveal the secret image. Many
schemes for visual cryptography have been proposed over the years. We use the
Naor and Shamir scheme for our protocol, but we conjecture that any other
visual scheme can be used as well.
Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme is used to bind a committer to a
value. The committer publishes a commitment that hides a value, which remains
secret until the committer reveals it. Should he reveal a different value, this
would be noticed, because two identical commitments hide the same value. Our
protocol uses a generalized Pedersen commitment scheme [20], which guarantees
unconditional hiding and allows the commitment to many values at once.
Oblivious transfer. Oblivious transfer schemes allow a chooser to pick some
pieces of information from a set a sender offers him, in such a way that (a) the
sender does not learn which pieces of information the choosers picks, and (b)
the chooser learns no more than the pieces of information he picks. Our protocol
adopts Tzeng’s oblivious transfer scheme [21]. In Tzeng’s scheme, the chooser
commits to some elements from a set, and sends the commitments to the sender.
This, in turn, obfuscates all the set’s elements, and the chooser will be able to
de-obfuscate only the elements he has committed to. It guarantees unconditional
security for the receiver’s choice, and it is efficient since it works with the sender
and receiver’s exchanging only two messages.
4.1 Description of the protocol in detail
We describe our protocol in reference to the four exam phases. In the description
we assume a few public parameters, namely:
n length of the candidate’s pseudonym
C = {s1, . . . , sk} alphabet of pseudonym’s characters
cj ∈ {0,1}t×u, j = 1, . . . , k (t × u)-pixel representation of a character
idC candidate ID
ex exam code
SPKE examiner’s public key
M set of possible marks
g, h ∈R Gq commitment generators
Preparation. The goal of preparation is to generate a candidate’s pseudonym,
which is a string of n characters taken from alphabet C, and to encode it into
two visual cryptographic shares. Both candidate and examiner cannot know the
pseudonym until they meet at testing, when the candidate learns her pseudonym
by overlapping the examiner’s share with hers. The underlying idea is that the
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candidate provides a commitment to an index into an array. The examiner fills
the array with a secret permutation of the characters, and only when the two
secrets are brought together is the selection of a character determined.
This phase is inspired by one of the schemes used to print a secret, proposed
by Essex et al. [10]. We tailor the scheme in such a way to be able to generate
a pseudonym. More specifically, we extend it to support an algorithm to resolve
a dispute that may arise when the overlapping of the shares will not reveal any
intelligible pseudonym. The main technical differences between our preparation
and the original scheme are: (a) a modified oblivious transfer protocol that copes
with several secret messages in only one protocol run; (b) the generation of
signatures that will be used for accountability in the resolution of disputes.
Figure 1 gives the description of the steps of preparation. The protocol begins
with the candidate providing a sequence of l commitments yi to an index into
an array of length k. (steps 1-2).
In detail, the parameter l, is chosen so that the l − n elements can be later
used for a cut-and-choose audit. The examiner can challenge the candidate to
check whether the committed choices are in fact in the interval [1, k]. Otherwise,
the examiner generates a sequence of randomly chosen t × u images, indicated
as α1, . . . , αl in Figure 1. A sequence of k images, (βi1, . . . , βik), are generated
from αi and each possible character cj . The sequence is randomly permuted and
repeated for all i, resulting in l sequences of (β11, . . . , β1k), . . . , (βl1, . . . , βlk). The
secret permutation and the commitment allow that the selection of character is
determined only when the two secrets are brought together.
The examiner then generates the obfuscation ωij from each βij and gener-
ates a commitment on each αi, indicated as com (step 3), which is signed and
sent with the sequences of obfuscations (ω11, . . . , ω1k),. . . , (ωl1, . . . , ωlk) to the
candidate (step 4). The obfuscation allows the candidate to retrieve only the
elements whose indexes correspond to the choices she committed in step 1 (yi).
The candidate performs a cut-and-choose audit, selecting a random set of l−n
sequences amongst the ω. Doing so, she can check whether the examiner gener-
ated the sequence of images correctly. The remaining substitutions σ1, σ2, . . . , σn
select the indexes of the images that make the pseudonym. Thus, the visual share
of the examiner consists of the concatenated images (ασ1 , . . . , ασn) (step 5-6).
The examiner then generates the proofs for the cut-and-choose audit, and
prints the visual share in a transparency printout. This also include all the
elements α1, . . . , αl and the value used for their commitment (step 7), which
are stored in the form of QR code. The examiner then sends the proofs and
the signed substitutions σ to the candidate (step 8). In turn, the candidate
checks the proofs, de-obfuscates the elements ω, and retrieves the visual share
consisting of the concatenated image (βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn). She finally prints the
share, together with the two signatures, on a paper printout (step 9). At this
point, both candidate and examiner have a visual share, which once overlapped
reveal an intelligible sequence of characters that serves as pseudonym.
The candidate’s paper printout includes two QR codes (QR1, and QR2 ) while
the examiner’s transparency only one (QR3 ). All the three QR codes share the
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same candidate identity idC and exam identifier ex. QR1 and QR2 encode the
two signatures of the examiner, respectively on commitment of the elements α
and on the substitutions σ, while QR3 encodes the elements α.
Testing. The candidate brings the paper printout, and the examiner the trans-
parencies. The examiner authenticates the identity of the candidate by checking
her identity document (step 10-11). He then gives the candidate her correspond-
ing transparency and a copy of the questions (step 12). The candidate overlaps
her paper printout with the transparency, and learns her pseudonym, which
writes it on the answer sheet (step 13). If no pseudonym appears, then this may
happen only if the candidate or the examiner misprinted their printouts, and
the Testing Dispute Resolution outlined in Algorithm 1 reveals the party that
is accountable for the misbehaviour. At the end of the phase, the candidate re-
turns the answer sheet anywhere in the pile of tests (step 14), and takes both
transparency and paper printouts home.
Marking and Notification. At marking the examiner evaluates the anony-
mous tests; at notification, the candidate to learn her mark, but only if she
wants to. The examiner evaluates the answers and generates a commitment on
the assigned mark (step 15). Then, he signs both mark and pseudonym found
on the answer sheet, and publishes the signature on a bulletin board (step 16).
Notification opens for a fixed time, during which the candidate can remotely
request to learn and register her mark. She has to send the ordered sequences of
β1, . . . , βn and all the signatures so far she collected to examiner (step 17). The
examiner checks the signatures, overlaps the given sequence with the correspond-
ing sequences of α1, . . . , αn, and learns the pseudonym. Again, if no registered
pseudonym appears, Dispute Resolution reveals the party who misbehaved. The
examiner signs the mark and the secret parameter used to commit the mark
(step 18), and sends the signature to the candidate (step 19). In so doing, the
candidate can verify the assigned mark against the bulletin board.
Dispute resolution. A corrupted examiner may misprint the visual share
printed on the transparency. Thus, the candidate retrieves no intelligible pseudonym
when she overlaps the visual shares, making her answers impossible to be anony-
mous. On the other hand, a corrupted candidate may misprint her paper printout
and charge the examiner for misprinting the transparency. Should, such a dispute
would arise, Algorithm 1 provides an efficient way to find the culprit.
We assume that the invigilator has an electronic device with a camera, such
as a smart phone or tablet, which stores the public key of the examiner. The
input of the Algorithm are the two QR codes printed on the paper printout
(QR1 and QR2) and the QR code printed on the transparency (QR3), which
the invigilator scans with the device camera.
First, the algorithm checks the correctness of the signatures encoded in QR1
and QR2. It also checks whether the candidate identity and the exam identifier
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Data: Public parameters: (C,n, gi, h, idC,SPKE)
- paper = ((βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn), idC ′, ex′, sign1 , sign2) where:
- sign1 = SignSSKE{idC′′, ex′′, com}
- sign2 = SignSSKE{idC′′′, ex′′′, (σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′n)}
- transp = (ασ′′
1
, ασ′′
2
, . . . , ασ′′n), idC ′, ex′, (α′1, α′2, . . . , α′l, s).
Result: Corrupted participant
if sign1 is verifiable with SPKE and sign2 is verifiable with SPKE and
idC = idC′ = idC′′ = idC′′′ and ex = ex′ = ex′′ = ex′′′ then
if com ≠ hs l∏
i=1 giα
′
i or pid=(α′σ′
1
, α′σ′
2
, . . . , α′σ′n)⊕ (βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn) then
return Examiner
else
return Candidate
else
return Candidate
Algorithm 1: Dispute resolution
reported on the paper printout match the ones in QR1 and QR2. If any one of
the checks fails then the candidate misprinted her paper printout thus she is the
culprit. Otherwise, the algorithm uses the data in QR3 to check the correctness
of the examiner’s commitment and that no pseudonym appears using the α
elements indexed with the σ substitutions encoded in QR3. If any one of these
checks fails then the examiner misprinted the transparency and thus he is guilty,
otherwise the candidate is the culprit.
5 Analysis
We analyse our protocol in ProVerif, a security protocol verifier that allows the
automatic analysis of authentication and privacy properties in the Dolev-Yao
model [7]. The input language of ProVerif is a variant of the applied pi-calculus.
5.1 Modelling Choices
No private channels. We model TLS and face-to-face communications among the
roles using shared key cryptography rather than private channels. This choice is
motivated because the attacker cannot monitor communications via ProVerif’s
private channels, and even know if any communication happens. We think this
is a too strong assumption that may miss attacks. By renouncing to private
channels, we achieve stronger security guarantees when analysing our protocol.
Moreover, our choice has a triple advantage: it allows the attacker to learn when
a candidate registers for the exam or is notified with a mark; it suffices to share
the key with the attacker when either the candidate or the examiner is corrupted;
it increases the chance the ProVerif verification terminates. Thus, the attacker
has more discretional power because he can observe when a candidate is given
the questions and when she submits the answers.
11
Data: Public parameters: (g, h,SPKE)
- sign3 = SignSSKE{pid , c}
- idC ,pid ′,mark , v.
Result: Whether the candidate was notified with the mark assigned to her test.
if pid = pid ′ and c = gvhmark then
return true
else
return false
Algorithm 2: The testMV for our protocol
Equational theory. We use the following equational theory to model the crypto-
graphic primitives needed in our protocol.
Probabilistic symmetric key sdec(senc(m,k, r), k) =m
Signature
getmess(sign(m,ssk)) =m
checksign(sign(m,ssk), spk(ssk)) =m
Visual cryptography
overlap(share, gen share(m,share)) =m
overlap(share, share) = share
Obfuscation deobf (obf (r,m,sel, commit(r′,sel)), r′) =m
The theory for probabilistic symmetric key and signature specifications are
well-known in ProVerif. We introduce a novel theory to model oblivious transfer
and visual cryptography. The function obf allows the examiner to obfuscate the
elements β1, . . . , βi, while the function deobf returns the correct element βsel
to the candidate, depending on the choice she committed. We also provide the
theory for the Pedersen commitment scheme with the function commit . Finally,
we model the generation of a visual cryptography share with gen share, and
their overlapping with the function overlap.
We verify Anonymous Marking in presence of a corrupted examiner. We
add the process collector that simulates the desk where candidates leave their
tests. Question Indistinguishability considers corrupted candidates, while Mark
Privacy and Mark Anonymity both consider corrupted eligible candidates. To
analyse Mark Verifiability, we define the algorithm testMV for our protocol as
depicted in Algorithm 2. We model an honest candidate, corrupted examiner
and co-candidates to prove the soundness of testMV. In particular, we use cor-
respondence assertions to verify the soundness of the algorithm in ProVerif,
and (non)reachability of the event KO to verify completeness. We check the
two soundness properties that regard Testing Dispute Resolution considering a
corrupted examiner in one, and corrupted candidates in the other.
A limitation of the formal model is the specification of the cut-and-choose
audit due to the powerful ProVerif’s attacker model. In fact, if the attacker plays
the cutter’s role, he might cut the set of elements such that the subset audited
by the chooser is correct, while the other subset not. Although in reality the
probability of success of this attack for a large set of elements is small, it is a
valid attack in ProVerif irrespective of the number of elements. In our case, the
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chooser is the candidate and the cutter the examiner. We thus have a false attack
when the examiner is corrupted, namely controlled by the attacker. In this case,
we avoid this situation by allowing the candidate to check all the elements of the
set. This is sound because the candidate plays the role of the chooser, thus she
is honest and follows the protocol although she knows the extra information.
Results. Table 1 outlines the results of our analysis. ProVerif confirms that
our protocol guarantees all the authentication properties despite allowing an
unbounded number of corrupted eligible co-candidates. Thus, our properties hold
although the attacker can register to the exam. Concerning privacy properties,
ProVerif proves that our protocol guarantees Anonymous Marking, Question
Indistinguishability, Mark Privacy, and Mark Anonymity. Finally, our protocol
is Mark Verifiable because testMV is sound and complete, and ensures Testing
Dispute Resolution: ProVerif shows that our protocol charges the misbehaving
party and not the honest, if the dispute algorithm is executed (soundness),
and the algorithm is not executed when both examiner and candidate roles are
honest (completeness).
Property Result Time
Candidate Authorisation ✓ 8s
Answer Authenticity ✓ 7s
Answer Origin Auth. ✓ 7s
Notification Request Auth. ✓ 8s
Mark Authenticity ✓ 8s
Property Result Time
Anonymous Marking ✓ 27s
Question Indist. ✓ <1s
Mark Privacy ✓ 28m 41s
Mark Anonymity ✓ 52m 12s
Mark Verifiability ✓ <1s
Testing Dispute Res. ✓ <1s
Table 1. The result of the formal analysis in ProVerif with a machine Intel i7, 8GB
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a new protocol for exams without the requirement of a trusted role.
The underlying idea is to combine oblivious transfer and visual cryptography
to generate a pseudonym which anonymises the test for the marking. A formal
analysis in ProVerif confirms the protocol ensures all the stated properties.
As future work we intend to extend our design to yield a larger set of ver-
ifiability properties. Moreover, to extend the application scenarios of our pro-
tocol, we intend to modify the notification phase in order to avoid the involve-
ment of the candidate at notification. To achieve this, we envisage a temporal
deanonymization solution similar to the one in Remark! [13]. Regarding the for-
mal analysis, we aim to study compositional proofs that integrate computational
proofs of the cryptographic primitives used in our protocol with the symbolic
ones obtained in ProVerif. Finally, we intend to implement a prototype of the
13
protocol, and verify if different visual cryptography schemes can be used to in-
crease the perceptual security of an examination.
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